After motivating the question more fully, I will reject two ways of answering-views that I see as constituting two extremes. On one of these views, while we are morally obligated to act in accordance with established, sensible collective schemes that in practice require many people jointly to act in the environmentally-friendly way, we are not morally obligated to act in this way unilaterally-which is to say outside of a collective scheme, where one person's potentially-lone action has no meaningful impact. On the other view, even in the absence of a collective scheme, and so even in the absence of assurance that many other people would join in, each person is nonetheless morally obligated to act in a way that would be sustainable if everyone were to act in this way. The truth, I believe, is somewhere in the messy middle. I will argue that each individual's moral obligation, roughly, is constantly to strive to do more than she/he does currently and to push her/himself into new, uncomfortable territory, but that no one is obligated to martyr her/himself for an environmental cause.
II. SETTING UP THE QUESTION
The question about the extent of an individual's obligation to perform environmentallyfriendly actions gets its full force only when one jointly recognizes four things.
First, the list of environmentally-friendly actions one could perform is incredibly long.
One could: have a small family (even altogether abstaining from having children); drive less, and walk, bicycle, or take public transit more; live close to where you work; carpool; drive the most fuel-efficient vehicle possible, and keep it tuned up and leak free, and its tires properly inflated; minimize the number of miles you fly; eat a vegetarian diet, especially if your meat would have been from animals raised in resource-intensive ways (as most meat sold in stores and restaurants is); eat food that is local and organic; invest in the stock of only environmentally-responsible companies; buy products that are produced in an environmentally-responsible manner (e.g., those that are made from recycled materials, have minimal packaging, etc.); buy products that are extensively reusable; buy second-hand items (especially clothing and furniture) rather than new items; recycle (metal, glass, plastics, newspapers, mixed paper, cardboard, Styrofoam, old electronics, etc.); properly dispose of automotive oil, batteries, tires, household hazardous waste;
avoid toxic or non-biodegradable products (paint, paint strippers, cleaning products, etc.); live in a small-sized dwelling; live in a region with a moderate climate; heat and cool your home minimally; ensure that your house is as energy efficient as possible (by, e.g., having plenty of insulation, doors that shut tightly, windows that are double-paned, and appliances that are 3 efficient, using compact fluorescent light bulbs and solar panels, turning lights and electronics off -possibly even unplugging electronics -when you are not using them, and buying renewable energy from your power company); renovate (flooring, cabinetry, countertops, etc.) using sustainable materials; take short showers; do not flush every time you go to the bathroom; do not wash clothes, towels, sheets, etc., unless they are genuinely sufficiently dirty; use a manual lawn mower; avoid synthetic fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides. The list could go on.
2 Second, many of these behaviors involve some cost to the individual engaging in them.
Consider, first, monetary costs. As an example, buying "green" products -organic food or clothes, say -often requires paying more than one would for the "conventional" alternative.
Fixing an oil leak in one's car can also be expensive. Some environmentally-friendly purchases will save the consumer money in the long run. Energy-efficient products are the obvious example: a more efficient refrigerator, dual-pane windows, home insulation, etc. Often, though, these will cost more up front-a nontrivial fact for people whose bank account is thin enough to make it difficult to do what will pay for itself (say) a decade later. Other costs are non-monetary.
Some environmentally-friendly actions involve making extra effort (e.g., bringing hazardous household waste to the appropriate municipal facility), enduring some inconvenience (e.g., walking rather than driving), or sacrificing some comfort (e.g., not air conditioning one's home on a hot day) or some enjoyment (e.g., not making a lovely sight-seeing drive). Sometimes these actions can actually save one money, but they count as costs overall when, in the individual's eyes, what is lost (comfort, convenience, etc.) outweighs the benefit of saving some money.
Third, the fact that the environmentally-friendly action is costly (in one or more of the aforementioned senses) means that many people -not all people, of course, but many peoplewill not actually perform the action unless required, or at least strongly pressured, to do so.
Fourth, the aforementioned kinds of actions have no noticeable impact unless they are consistently being performed by many people. Environmental problems are, in other words, collective-action problems. I might refrain from taking a jet ski 3 onto a local lake so that I do not contribute to the pollution of the lake; but if everyone else who would normally go jet skiing there does so just the same, the effect of my refraining fails to register. Any test of the lake's water quality will produce the same results as if I had joined in the fun. Relatedly, if no one else is performing some particular environmentally-unfriendly action, the environment is not made worse off in any appreciable way by one single person doing so. So, if I alone jet ski, a test of the lake's water quality will come back the same as if no one at all jet skied. These two related points hold in respect to every one of the possible environmentally-friendly actions I listed earlier-and especially when impacts are assessed on a large scale.
The difficulty is now apparent. Given how many environmentally-beneficial actions one could conceivably perform, that so many of these involve a cost to the individual performing them, that many people thus have incentive not to perform them, and that whether or not one individual performs an action does not have any noticeable effect on the environment, it is far from clear how many such actions one is actually morally obligated to perform.
III. SOME BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
Every argument depends on at least one claim whose truth is simply granted at the outset. 4 In this paper, there are several claims on which my argument depends but for which I
will not rigorously argue.
First, I will take for granted that morality makes demands of us-including, sometimes, demands that we do not welcome. Finally, I am simply going to assume that normative ethical issues are ones it makes sense to discuss and in respect to which it makes sense to offer philosophical arguments. The question, "What is morally required?" is alas not settled in the way the question, "What is the temperature in the room?" is settled-namely by waving a scientific instrument through the air.
But answers to the former kind of question, no less than those to the latter, can be supported with reasons and evidence. "What is morally required?" is thus also different from "What flavor of ice cream is tastiest?" Where people disagree about which flavor of ice cream is tastiest, there is little to no room for persuasion based in reasoned discussion, whereas philosophical 6 argumentation is appropriate in trying to resolve normative moral questions. Not all philosophers agree with this, but it is something I will take for granted here.
IV. ONE WRONG ANSWER
One of the most provocative answers to the question of the extent of an individual's moral obligation in respect to the environment comes from Baylor Johnson (2003 recognize that this may well bring accusations of hypocrisy that would undermine one's prospects for successful organizing.) Relatedly, he allows that making individual reductions may set an example for others-though he is pessimistic about the chances that this example will inspire to action a sufficient number of others as to make an overall difference.
8 Nonetheless, Johnson maintains that unilateral actions are never obligatory. He does acknowledge that "It isn't right… to follow a mob to do evil, and deeply engrained social practices can be morally wrong -slavery, for example -and it is the responsibility of individuals to resist the common wisdom and the material temptation, and to take the right stand however lonely and however costly it may be" (ibid.: 276). He does not, however, believe this carries over to individual actions in the context of the environment. He says that "The only reason to adopt unilateral restraint… is to avert a [tragedy of the commons]. So if unilateral restraint cannot reasonably be expected to achieve its purpose, there is no reason, and hence no moral reason, to adopt it" (ibid.: 277). On one occasion he says that in respect to big environmental problems, "no individual's use of the commons is harmful" (ibid.: 278). This, he notes, is what makes, e.g., driving a gas-guzzling car different from, say, murder and lying: an act of murder harms, and lying (at least) often does so, whereas no matter how big a guzzler the vehicle is, no meaningful harm is done through the driving of it. 7 This claim is echoed by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, who says that driving "a gas-guzzling sport-utility vehicle... on sunny Sunday afternoons… just for fun… does not cause harm in normal cases." (2005: 288-9). The point is also made in respect to helping. Sinnott-Armstrong considers the possibility that "I have no moral obligation to contribute to famine relief because the famine will continue and people will die whether or not I donate my money to a relief agency"; but such reasoning is flawed, he replies, because "I could help a certain individual if I gave my donation directly to that individual" (ibid.: 291). It is, however, more compelling in the environmental context, since "if I refrain from driving for fun on this one Sunday, there is no individual who will be helped in the least" (ibid.: 291).
There are, of course, numerous possible objections to this. Johnson himself actually considers one, which goes as follows: Johnson says that "If and when a cooperative scheme to avoid a commons problem is in place, failure to adhere to it would normally be a form of free riding-an attempt to enjoy the benefits of others' sacrifices while avoiding one's own fair share of them" (2003: 272). But -as an extension of my second point, above -surely free-riding can occur, and count as wrong, even outside of a formal cooperative scheme. Consider an apartment complex where every two weeks a paid employee scoops leaves out of the swimming pool. However, leaves accumulate in the pool quickly. There is no collective agreement that residents will scoop out leaves; in fact, the formal pre-existing agreement stipulates that the complex employee will do so. Nonetheless, imagine that I recognize the need, and so take the net and do some cleaning. Another tenantone with whom I have never spoken -sees me doing so and the next day takes a turn of her own.
The next day, another tenant -again, without any communication -takes a turn; and so on. A dozen tenants join in, but there is still nothing official about this scheme. There is, however, one person who swims every day, but who would not do so if there were leaves in the pool, and who knows both that other residents have informally started taking turns doing some cleaning and that without this there would be many leaves in the pool, but who never takes a turn cleaning. This person is free-riding, and is morally derelict. Again, this shows that Johnson is trying to get too much leverage out of the notion of a pre-existing agreement or formal cooperative scheme. (ibid.: 284). In my judgment, however, these differences are not that significant. The features of a tragedy of the commons scenario that Johnson's case really rests on are present in the context of working to establish a collective scheme, namely: there are many possible collective agreements, and fixing our environmental problems will require many actual collective agreements, not just one; doing so is costly (requiring both time and, in almost every case, money); most people will not perform this work; and it takes the work of many people to get even a single a collective scheme in place (so that one individual's efforts will be fruitless if no one else is working on this and needless if many others are working on it). And here, Johnson's aforementioned tack of locating moral reasons in the terms of a pre-existing agreement will unquestionably not work. There is not a pre-existing collective agreement to work to establish collective agreements; and even if there were, the problem could then just be pushed up a level.
14 (To avoid an infinite regress, at some point reasons to work to establish a collective agreement must be located outside of a pre-existing agreement.) Now, as I will explain in the next section, I cannot get on board with what we have dubbed the Kantian principle in the context of environmentally-friendly actions. That said, to me it is now plain that the absence of a collective agreement does not entirely excuse one from the moral obligation to perform environmentally-friendly actions. Any sensible account of our moral obligations will need to make room for non-consequentialist reasons for acting. Johnson's does not do so. As noted above, he says that "The only reason to adopt unilateral restraint… is to avert a [tragedy of the commons]. So if unilateral restraint cannot reasonably be expected to achieve its purpose, there is no reason, and hence no moral reason, to adopt it" (ibid.: 277). This omits so much. There are plainly non-consequentialist reasons for voting (even where the election will turn out no differently than if you had not voted) and for refraining from joining others in putting your pebble on the pile or in pushing the car over the cliff (even where the innocent person will die just as certainly as if you had set your pebble on him or helped push the car); and I will argue that there are similar reasons for performing environmentally-friendly actions unilaterally.
I have always been sympathetic to Joel Feinberg's (1970) argument about the "expressive function" of punishment-and have also always taken it to be relevant in many additional contexts. Feinberg acknowledges that "the relation of the expressive function of punishment to its central purposes" -in short, deterrence and retribution -"is not always easy to trace" (ibid.: significance of doing so. The same kinds of considerations are also relevant in the pebble-laying and car-pushing cases. In both, the innocent person is going to die whether or not one joins in; but refraining expresses that one is not complicit, symbolically cleanses one's hands of blood, and thus liberates one from guilt by association.
By the same token, performing environmentally-friendly actions unilaterally plainly has an extremely important symbolic, expressive function. When one makes the decision to live close to where one works, one proclaims that one is not complicit in the harm (in the form of polluted air, a changed climate, etc.) that results when many people engage in long commutes.
By, say, biking to work, one declares one's repudiation of lifestyles built around the rapacious, unsustainable consumption of fossil fuels. By eschewing meat, one engages in a form of protest -important more for what it symbolizes than for what it accomplishes -against the wastefulness and pollution of factory farms, and indeed against a view of animals as resources existing simply for humans' benefit. By setting one's recycling bin out for pickup each week, one expresses one's disapproval of wastefulness, and symbolically announces that one cares about the future of the planet (including all those people who will dwell on it). By doing nothing in respect to recycling one communicates the opposite message. And if one works for the establishment of a recycling-related collective scheme but prior to its establishment does not actually recycle, one at best communicates a mixed message. Now, all the examples just mentioned are ones where the performance or nonperformance of the act is not private. Others see my recycling bin on the curb or see that it is not there. They see me biking to work, or driving there. And they at least sometimes see me eating meat or refraining from doing so. What work can the notion of actions' expressive or symbolic function do when the actions are more private-as, for example, adding insulation to your attic is? Here, one may be affirming something to members of one's family-perhaps children in the family, most importantly; but even if one is not doing that, it is important that by performing the action one is affirming something to oneself.
All of this, but especially the idea of affirming something to oneself, relates closely to integrity. Everyone takes integrity to be a virtue. As Marion Hourdequin (2010) has noted, integrity and integration are related notions: to be a person of integrity is, roughly, to be a person whose values and behaviors are integrated, or in other words, harmonize. There are many ways one might lack integrity. As Hourdequin correctly observes, one of these is to value a healthy environment -e.g., clean air, large thriving forests, unpolluted oceans, etc. Ronald Sandler (2010) has argued that environmental ethicists should be much more oriented toward virtue ethics, and no doubt he is right that thinking in terms of virtues is useful. It is, however, not enough. I want to know how much in the way of environmentally-friendly actions is morally required of me, and thinking about the virtues will always leave that question open to a very large degree. So, too, alas, will talk of expressive functions, symbolic significance, and so on. They do, though -as I have made clear -at least push us away from Johnson's account.
V. ANOTHER WRONG ANSWER
According to the argument in the previous section, Johnson's position -which I said constituted one of two extremes -is wrong. Each individual has moral reasons to make unilateral reductions in her/his consumption and pollution. These reasons are strong enough that, at least sometimes, it is wrong not to make the unilateral reduction. This does not mean, however, that the view constituting the other extreme is the correct one. According to this view, the fact that environmental problems are collective-action problems, and that many people will not join you in performing the environmentally-friendly action, in no way excuses you from doing so unilaterally. On this view, which we might reasonably call Kantian, you are morally obligated to act in a sustainable manner regardless of what others are doing. Or, to put it slightly differently, even where no collective scheme is in place, you are morally obligated to act as you would be required if the collective agreement existed.
What is the problem with this view? Recall from earlier that Johnson claimed that environmental problems share the following three characteristics: (1) a person who draws on the commons at an unsustainable level stands to benefit considerably from doing so and would lose appreciably from refraining; (2) when a person refrains from unsustainable use of the commons, she/he in effect makes it easier for others to increase their use; and (3) "there is no collective agreement to prevent the aggregate harm by individual acts of restraint." Again, Johnson has maintained that his argument does not entail that putting one's pebble on the pile is permissible because that kind of case does not fit the third of those characteristics. I have argued that this is unconvincing. The first of those features, though, may be able to do more work. In the pebble case, individuals probably do not stand to benefit considerably from putting their pebble on the pile and would not lose significantly by refraining. The same is true in respect to helping to push the car off the cliff and to voting. Were this different, though -that is, were there a very high cost associated with holding back one's pebble, or abstaining from helping to push the car, or voting -then it would not be nearly so obvious that one is morally obligated to do these things. as it were, putting my consumption and pollution "on the pile," even if my consumption and pollution would be far from necessary or sufficient for causing environmental harm. But these reasons are not indefeasible; and they are annulled or overridden specifically in cases where the environmentally-friendly actions become -as they certainly can -sufficiently burdensome.
VI. THE MIDDLE WAY
The critical question at this stage is: How substantial does the sacrifice to one's own welfare need to be before the non-consequentialist reasons for performing the environmentally-friendly unilateral actions are defeated? Alas, it is very difficult to specify, in general, with any high degree of exactness. There are too many variables to be able to say, e.g., that one ought to perform 117 environmentally-friendly unilateral actions, or that one ought unilaterally to devote 23% of one's income to environmentally-friendly purchases/investments, or anything of this sort.
Instead, I believe it is most illuminating to proceed via a handful of analogies. In athletic training, one can generally be sure one is not exercising in a sufficiently vigorous way if there is no strain or pain involved; and, by the same token, one is doing too much if one exercises so hard as to cripple oneself. In education, if one does not push oneself to the point of discomfortof being tired, and of confronting claims that are hard to understand and/or challenge one's longstanding commitments -one is not doing enough; but one is doing too much if one studies to the point where one emotionally collapses or forsakes all one's other projects and relationships. In employment, if one never works hard enough to be tired or stressed, and never thinks about one's job-related responsibilities when one is home in the evening, one is not doing enough; but if one works so hard that one never sees one's children or gives oneself terrible ulcers, one is doing too much. In parenting, if one is never willing to be inconvenienced by driving one's child somewhere or getting out of bed at night when one's child has a nightmare, one is not doing enough; but if one instantly drops what one is doing, no matter how personally important, every time one's child faintly requests it, then one is going further than one is obligated.
The analogies are imperfect, but are important nonetheless. They demonstrate several things. First, there are many kinds of cases in which we lack a very precise formula for determining whether we are doing as much as we ought to be-and, in fact, we are not especially surprised or disturbed by the lack of such a formula in those cases. In light of this, our inability 22 to fix an exact extent to which we ought to perform environmentally-friendly actions should not be viewed as especially disappointing, and indeed the initial suspicion that we might be able to specify precisely how much we are morally obligated to do in the environmental context looks somewhat naïve. Second, what we can reasonably say, in so many kinds of cases in life, is that one is not expected to be as fully devoted to an end as one could possibly be, but one is plainly not doing enough if one stays entirely within the realm of comfort and convenience. So, prima facie, it is sensible to think the same is true of our duties in respect to the environment.
There arises at this point a question about the degree of subjectivity in my account.
Plainly, the same action will not necessarily always strike two people as equally taxing.
However, this does not mean that the account is therefore thoroughly subjective. Let us return to the exercise example. A five-mile run is a breeze for some people, and for others is would be brutal. But if someone says that taking one 15 minute walk a day is too arduous, we are generally incredulous. If this is indeed too arduous, it means that that the individual is very unhealthy.
Similarly, for some people there is little discomfort or inconvenience in biking to work or installing solar panels on their home. For others, though, this will be much more taxing. This degree of subjectivity does not particularly concern me. Indeed, it leaves room for us to say, as, for example, Lucie Middlemiss (2010) has, that what exactly one's environmental obligations are turns to some degree on one's financial means and life circumstances. However, if someone says that the effort associated with recycling is enough to make her/him uncomfortable and thus is all she/he is obligated to do, she/he is either exaggerating or lazy. For the majority of us, whose recyclables are picked up at the curb outside our house, recycling is simply not cumbersome (physically or financially). As for those things which do involve discomfort, it is also relevant to note that, as with so many other things in life, the more you perform various environmentally-friendly actions, the more accustomed to these you become, and the less uncomfortable doing them seems. Carpooling to work and eating less meat are examples. Finally, we must recognize that not everything that seems like a burden truly is. As Chrisoula Andreou (2010) has explained, ample psychological research has shown that so much of our environmentally-taxing material consumption fails to contribute significantly to our happiness.
So, I finally return to my initial question: Is my environmental impact small enough as to satisfy the demands of morality? I do not do all that I could-but it is not my obligation to do so.
On the other hand, there are many environmentally-friendly actions I perform unilaterally, and I have strong non-consequentialist reasons for doing so. So, I am in that messy middle, which, in general, is where I should be. Indeed, I do enough as to involve some discomfort and inconvenience. However, much of what once seemed to me quite taxing is now practically second nature. I have settled into a routine, and my obligation is to strive further and challenge myself anew. I am not failing egregiously, but there is more I can do without seriously sacrificing my well-being. The crawlspace of my house is ready for insulation, and local organic farmers are ready for more of my business! It is time to stop talking and take action.
